I. Introduction
The Mecca of the economics lies in economic biology... But biological conceptions are more complex than those of mechanics; a volume on Faundarions must therefore give a relatively large place to mechanical analogies, and frequent use is made of the term equilibrium which suggests something of a static analogy. (Marshall 1948) .
This famous passage from Marshall's Principles of Economics (it first appeared in the fifth edition which came out in 1907) nicely brings out two issues, which are as germane to economics today as they were when Marshall wrote. The first is the heavy reliance by economists in their formal theorizing on the notion of "equilibrium". The other is the appeal that ''biological conceptions" have for many economists, particularly when their focus is on economic change. Marshall clearly believed that our science should aim to understand economic change and not simply the forces molding and sustaining the current configuration of economic variables. His "mechanical analogies" and equilibrium concepts included those of Newtonian dynamics, as well as those associated with the balancing of forces on bodies at rest. Since the time of Marshall, and following his lead, economists have developed their own equilibrium concepts. While until recently they were mostly associated with analyses of situations presumed to be at rest, in recent years much of economic theorizing has been concerned with dynamics, and the equilibria, like those of Newtonian dynamics, are ones in which the variables under study change over time. But Marshall might observe that the equilibrium concept in these models still somehow has a static feel to it.
Few economists confuse the formal static or dynamic equilibrium theory with the reality. Most readily acknowledge that at least some economic situations need to be understood as involving significant elements of novelty, so that the actors should be regarded as searching for a best action, as contrasted with actually having found it. In their analysis of certain economic phenomena, for example technical advance, many economists recognize that frequent or continuing shocks, generated internally as well as externally, may make it hazardous to assume that the systemever will get to an equilibrium in the theory must be understood as an "attractor" rather than a characteristic of where the system is.
However, until recently at least, there has been a resistance to building these complications into formal modds. Partly the reason is a belief that to do so would make the modds intractable, or at least complex and difficult to understand. This seems to have been Marshall's concern. But nowadays this predilection seems more than simply a matter of analytic tractability and convenience.
When expressly doing or talking theory, unlike Marshall most contemporary economists seem to be drawn to equilibrium concepts as a matter of aesthetics. General equilibrium theories that depart from these canons are seen as somewhat adhoc.
It is interesting, therefore, that when etonomists are describing or explaining particular empirical subject matter in a context that does not demand that they write or talk theory explicitly, they often eschew equilibrium language, and reveal the same inclination as did Marshall to make use of ''biological conceptions" or metaphors. I noted above the proclivity of many economists to consider individuals and organizations as entities that search and "learn". Industrial organization economists sometimes characterize certain industries as "young" and others as "mature" with the connotation that various things naturally happen as an industry gets older (Mueller/Tilton 1969). Similar language often is used in comparing economies. Evolutionary or developmental language is used quite widely by economists to describe how the structure of an economy, or an industry, or technology, or the law, changes over time. Writings in economic history almost invariably are full of such biological metaphors.
All this is reminiscent of Marshall. Yet while he was attracted to "biological conceptions", it is apparent that Marshall never had in mind simply applying biological theory to economics. Indeed, the fact that he felt hirnself forced to fall back on "mechanical analogies" tells us that he found it very difficult to develop a formal theory, based on ''biological conceptions", that he thought adequate for economic analysis. In the years since Marshall, not many economists have even tried. (For a splendid history of evolutionary theorizing in economics, see Hodgson 1993.) Indeed, while some contemporary economists continue to feel the same tension as did Marshall, that group seems definitdy a minority. One certainly can rationalize the two different styles of economic discourse and analysis as just what one would expect, given their purposes. Describing, and explaining, in a context where it is important to be sensitive to the details, is one thing. Theorizing is quite another.
However this proposition is problematic on at least two counts. First, the farther the language of particular explanations is from the logic of formal theory, the less analytic structure the latter can provide the former. Economists who would eschew equilibrium language, and use ''biological conceptions" in describ-
